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The University of Memphis  
in time of daffodils (who know  
the goal of living is to grow)  
             forgetting why, remember how 
 
in time of lilacs who proclaim  
             the aim of waking is to dream,  
             remember so (forgetting seem)  
 
             in time of roses (who amaze  
             our now and here with paradise)  
             forgetting if, remember yes  
 
             in time of all sweet things beyond  
             whatever mind may comprehend,  
             remember seek (forgetting find)  
 
             and in a mystery to be  
             (when time from time shall set us free)  
             forgetting me, remember me.  
– E.E. Cummings, in time of daffodils 
 
The daffodil, as you may know, has another name: Narcissus. 
According to the myth, when Narcissus dies he undergoes a metamorphosis. 
As he passes into the underworld he continues to stare at his reflection in the 
river Styx. When those who are going to bury him return to collect his body, 
they find a flower growing where his body should have been, its reflected 
image now replacing his.1  How does Narcissus become the daffodil, both 
metamorphosed and reflected? Perhaps it is through a love that echoes. 
Through my reading of the section of Pleshette Dearmitt’s book The Right to 
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Narcissism, entitled “Kristeva: the Rebirth of Narcissus,” I hope to mirror this 
myth by showing the way in which DeArmitt’s reading of Narcissus is 
reflected in Julia Kristeva’s conception of genius.  
One might say that a relationship with words, and the ability to form 
relationships through words and the ideas they implant in others, are at the 
center of the life of the scholar and the teacher, and for DeArmitt’s work, 
words and relationships formed this center, not only in their role as a 
medium of communication, but as important concepts to be theorized 
themselves. In writing her book, DeArmitt took seriously the idea that by 
discussing just one word, narcissism, and re-narrating its relationship to 
other concepts, she could orchestrate its metamorphosis from being 
emblematic of problematic self-centeredness to showing that the other, 
especially the relationship to the mother for Kristeva, is central to the 
constitution and development of the self, as well as its flourishing. We might 
say that the enclosed bud of Narcissus blossomed through DeArmitt’s 
words, under her pen. “The failure to articulate language as love reveals 
our inability to respond to narcissism”2 is DeArmitt’s claim in the section of 
her book on Kristeva. According to her interpretation, all love is a form of 
narcissism, and it is love that makes possible language, meaning, and the 
self. Love is not just attachment, but is a passion which can both be 
represented and felt. According to DeArmitt’s work, our problem today is 
not that we have too much narcissism, even though our “selfie” culture 
might make it appear that way. Rather, we do not have enough narcissism, 
and this is coupled with the inability to elaborate upon the meaning of 
narcissism or to put it into words that are connected to affect. This 
description of the problem echoes Kristeva’s concern about the falling away 
of the semiotic, affective dimension of language from the symbolic, law-like 
aspect of language, which only together, through the signifying process, 
make meaning. DeArmitt’s elaboration of narcissism in this section focuses 
on retracing the concept in psychoanalysis with, and through, Kristeva’s 
thought. According to this account, psychoanalysis reveals that the speaking 
being is a wounded being whose speech wells up out of an ache for love and 
self-love is a primary identity organization which enables the emergence of 
the subject through psychic space.3  
In order for individuation to occur, or for the subject to emerge, the 
infant must separate from the mother. This is a struggle, though, because the 
infant relies on the mother for care and does not yet see the mother as a 
separate being but as fused with the child in a state of plentitude.4 There is a 
bodily meaning structure in the mother’s care that has a hold on the infant 
from which he or she must abject by rejecting the mother.5 In order to fully 
separate there must be a third term in the mother-child dyad, something 
other than the child which the mother desires.6 It is the separation that this 
“third” introduces that makes love between separate beings replace fusion 
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into one being. Through discourse aimed at someone else the child begins to 
realize that there is a third party,7 which for Kristeva is the symbolic, or 
language, that makes space or absence possible. She sometimes calls this 
third the imaginary father, but it is important to note, according to 
DeArmitt, that the position of mother or father is not necessarily sexed, that 
these could just as easily be labeled as X and Y, and that the figure of the 
third is actually a conglomeration of both parents.8 This is because there is 
no distinction between subject and object, so there is also no distinction 
between the parents yet.  
Furthermore, because the child identifies with this figure, it is an ideal 
other, as the possibility of absence, of love, or of interdiction.9 In 
identification the subject-in-formation is transferred to the site of the other, 
to the place from which he or she is seen and heard. The mother’s discourse 
with an other, her speech about her love for the child, and the stories she 
tells about the child, is the backdrop for the development of the mother’s 
love for her child becoming manifest, making it possible for the child to 
begin to love himself or herself as a self.10 The emerging subject catches the 
words of others and repeats them, giving them back with his or her own 
voice. The primary identification, then, is mimicking sounds in the oral 
domain, “chewing, swallowing [and] nourishing oneself [. . . ] with 
words.”11 The child loves himself or herself in learning and repeating 
language through which the other is symbolically taken in through rhythmic 
words, sounds, and signs. The speech of the other is a model or pattern with 
which the infant identifies repeatedly, and it is through identifying with the 
third, identifying and returning language, the forming subject becomes like 
the other, a subject him or herself who can use and recreate the other’s 
language, allowing for self-reflection.12 In this account we can see that 
narcissism, self-love, and the self as self-reflective, can only come about 
through the relationship with, and words of, the other.  
 This individuation process occurs through transference, which Kristeva 
describes as having a metaphorical structure that “indicates a movement in 
which one thing is transported or carried over to the place of another, but it 
also implies an alteration or transformation.”13 In other words, the metaphor 
is a metamorphosis and “what is at stake in transference is a metamorphosis 
in which the preverbal child—the infans—becomes capable of heterogeneous 
representations.”14 I take these representations to be heterogeneous both in 
the sense that they are drawn from all of the senses and that they combine 
the two aspects of the signifying process, both the affective, semiotic level 
and the structured symbolic level. There is no fixed subject for Kristeva, but 
rather a subject-in-process as a series of repeated transferences, making the 
psychic space opened up in identification a space of the imaginary, “where 
seeming is not opposed to being, but rather where seeming is being.”15 
These representations become the core of self-identity.  
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All love comes from self-love because it is a repetition of this metaphor, 
of this identification and transference. The first variant of identification, or 
its first repetition, occurs through idealization, the capacity to project one’s 
“own ideal image (itself an imaginary construction based on the child’s first 
and most influential identification with the father-mother conglomeration in 
personal prehistory) onto the beloved only to have it returned.”16 The lover 
is transferred to the place of the loved one, where the “I” is “paradoxically 
both expanded and annihilated as other”17 in a sort of “nontime” which is 
both “instant and eternity” that “fulfills me [and] abolishes me.”18 Love, as 
love, is a blending of identities in a reciprocal transformation, making it a 
metamorphosed and doubled Narcissus: the daffodil growing on the bank of 
the Styx. 
This rehabilitation of self-love as love for and through the other is what 
DeArmitt claimed Kristeva undertook in her more recent works, and is 
illustrated especially in Kristeva’s works on revolt, The Sense and Non-sense of 
Revolt and Intimate Revolt, as well as in the Female Genius trilogy, a series of 
intellectual biographies about the political theorist Hannah Arendt, the 
psychoanalyst Melanie Klein, and the writer Colette.19  Kristeva’s conception 
of revolt concerns the non-time of love as the time of identification20 
described above. Intimate revolt has two parts, first, the return to, or 
recollection of, this “timeless” affective, semiotic realm that is not integrated 
into consciousness, and secondly, the expression of it in language, which 
fully accomplishes the experience in time. Revolt is the double movement of 
the dissolution or destabilization of the subject and meaning in identification 
and the accomplishment of meaning in the dialectic of the semiotic and 
symbolic through the stabilization of the subject experienced in the 
repetition of the narcissistic structure as a link to an other21 through words. 
The self is restructured through this experience and comprehension of the 
signifying process; that of losing the self in the experience of semiotic 
timelessness, and then integrating the rupture in time caused by the semiotic 
into linear time through the construction of symbols.  
This conception of revolt informed DeArmitt’s interpretation of 
Kristeva’s conclusion to the Female Genius trilogy, entitled “Is There a 
Feminine Genius,” which she often taught in her seminars. In this work 
Kristeva emphasizes three characteristics her geniuses share: a profound 
attachment to the other, the identification of life and thought, and living and 
conceiving of time as rebirth. To more explicitly state the connection, in the 
introduction to the trilogy Kristeva states that “the work of a genius 
culminates in the birth of a subject,” which is the same work at stake in the 
metaphor of Narcissus. DeArmitt connected the idea of birth to Colette’s use 
of the image of éclosion, which also means hatching or blossoming.22 Though 
DeArmitt did not explain the connection between Narcissus and genius in 
either her lectures or in her book, I will graft together the ideas that flowered 
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through the spoken words of her lectures, the written words in her book, 
and my own work, which has budded from this inquiry, to illustrate that the 
aspects of feminine genius elaborate upon the rehabilitation or rebirth of 
Narcissus, since each aspect is born out the relationship of identification it 
recreates. A rehabilitation of narcissism and a rehabilitation of genius reflect 
one another, leading to a reconceptualization of the self.   
You may not know that the flowers of Narcissus have a tripartite 
structure and fitting with this biological description, there are three volumes 
on feminine genius. These works are love stories since they are based on 
identification in their content and in their form. On a cultural level, each of 
Kristeva’s geniuses has established a metaphorical relation that repeats the 
narcissistic structure, which is returned to through revolt. Though each 
genius has a relation that reflects this form, for each the relationship 
manifests itself through a different register. For Arendt, the relation is 
between the actor and the spectator; for Klein it is between the analyst and 
the analysand; and for Colette it is between the writer and the reader. 
Narration, the sharing of words, is also central to each of these relationships, 
and this is illustrated in the points of intersection between her geniuses 
which Kristeva draws from their lives and works.  
In the volume on Hannah Arendt, “who” someone is comes about in the 
relationship between the spectator or narrator and the actor who is narrated. 
There is a transference here, though, because the positions change – those 
who narrate are also narrated, leaving the action that is initiated by the actor 
incomplete until it is given meaning through another action, the narration by 
the spectator. In this movement we narrate each other, and through others 
we are also narrated, forming a web of human relationships that make the 
identity, or the singularity of who someone is, possible. For Melanie Klein, 
the psychoanalyst identifies with the child being analyzed, and through this 
is taken back to the experience of the process of her own self-construction. 
She is then able to elaborate on the experiences of the child, freeing up the 
child’s own ability to form an imaginary space of representations and the 
ability to narrate him or herself. Colette’s written work, through sensorial 
language, turns symbols into flesh, rekindling the affective dimension of 
language. This occurs because she writes her mother as a metaphor, or, to 
put it differently, she writes through identifying with her mother (and her 
mother’s writing in their lifelong correspondence through letters, which she 
reads and rewrites). By using her mother as a metaphor for her style, a 
metamorphosis occurs; Colette becomes like her mother and sees from a 
mother’s point of view, becoming both the reader and the writer. 
The structure of the Female Genius texts is also one of identification 
which creates renewal or revolt. In the Hannah Arendt volume, Kristeva 
describes one of Arendt’s works, a biography of Rahel Varnhagen, as a work 
of identification (even is Arendt herself would have denied this). Arendt 
does claim that her only purpose was to narrate Varnhagen’s life “as she 
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would have told it.”23 From this statement we can see why Kristeva might 
conclude that this is a work of identification, since it seems that Arendt had 
to put herself into the place of Varnhagen to write in this way, making this 
“narrative [. . .] the mediator for this metamorphosis.”24 Importantly, this is 
no ordinary biography, but a work that is “dense, out of the ordinary, and 
peppered with many details that Rahel had revealed in her letters and 
diaries that the author often repeats without citing them as such”25 which 
Arendt intermixes with her own philosophical and personal reflections. At 
times it is difficult to determine whose voice is speaking in the text, and 
often the reader is able to forget, for pages, that the book being read is a 
biography and not an essay on social and political philosophy. Kristeva 
claims that the writing the life of Rahel was a fertile process that underlies 
Arendt's later work. We might imagine Kristeva’s approach to writing the 
trilogy as an echo of Narcissus, since it seems she internalized a pattern of 
narration from Arendt’s work in order to write this series of biographies. 
These works are also autobiographies that show the formation of the 
trajectory of Kristeva’s thought, since she writes her theory by repeating the 
words of these women but endows them with her own thought by 
reforming their words through her own voice. We can now say that these 
works are of the genus, or better, the genius, of Narcissus.  
DeArmitt’s lectures, like her book, were close readings of others’ texts 
that mapped the way a concept, a word, appeared, reappeared, and 
disappeared in the context of the work. She often explained the word’s 
etymology and its use in the texts of other authors to create a fertile 
background in which to plot the relationship of this term to other concepts 
within the text at hand. She often used her own words, stories from her life 
and experiences, to illustrate difficult concepts, adding topsoil to the flower 
bed of meaning. 
Nourished by DeArmitt’s lectures in the graduate seminar she taught 
on the concept of the feminine in twentieth century Continental Philosophy, 
I became interested not only in her narration and re-narration of the concept 
of the feminine, but also in the way in which narration as a practice and as a 
concept itself is connected to femininity, subjectivity, metaphor and rebirth 
in the work of Kristeva. My dissertation project was born out of this inquiry. 
DeArmitt told me that “sometimes professors are inspired by the interests of 
their students,” and I was delighted when she later taught a seminar on the 
connection between narration and the development and redefinition of the 
self in the work of Kristeva, Adrianna Cavarero and Judith Butler. 
DeArmitt’s practice of passionately narrating and re-narrating these 
concepts inspired my interest in narration, which she reflected back to me, 
always deepening my inquiry, always budding new connections and 
thoughts. In her own words “one finds [narcissism] again in the object 
(where it is reflected).”26  Pleshette DeArmitt’s words planted the bulb of the 
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Narcissus in me, which even when its flower’s season has passed is 
nourished by the soil that surrounds it. Although its blossoming is reflected 
in the river Styx, it survives the recurrences of winter, perpetually re-
blossoming.  
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